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Three Letters on Computer Security and
Society
Purdue Technical Report CSD-TR-91-088
Eugene H. Spafford
Department of Computer Sciences
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1398
spaf@cs.purdue.edu
December 1991
Over the past few years, I have had occasion to write letters to the editors
of various journal in response to publication of others' material. Many of
these have focused on the interaction of computer security policy with the
interests of the computing profession and society at large. I have had several
requests for copies of three of these letters, and I have collected all three in
one document for ease of distribution.
The enclosed letters were all published in somewhat abbreviated form.
Each is presented here, as I wrote it, and before any editing was done for
publication.
The first letter was published in the ACM Forum section of COMMUNI-
CATIONS OF THE ACM. The issue was #33(10), and appeared in October
of 1990.
The second letter was published in SCIENCE NEWS, #139(20), and ap-
peared in the May IS, 1991 issue.
The third letter will be published in THE SCIENCES in the JanuaryfFebruary
1991 issue.
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Communications of the ACM
ACM Publications Office
11 West 42nd. St.
New York, NY 10036
To the editor:
Department of Computer Sciences
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1398
9 June 1990
The May issue of Communications contained a "News Track" account of some of my remarks
on hiring known hackersjcrackers. I believe the report was derived from my keynote presentation
at the 3ed DPMA Virus Workshop, held March 14 in New York. Unfortunately, the item in
question did not report the full context of my remarks, and thus the actual intent was obscured.
It is my contention that we should not do business with companies that hire known computer
miscreants because of their criminal escapades. There are two reasons for this, one grounded
in good business sense, and the other grounded in professional ethics.
From a business standpoint, hiring a known computer criminal because of his criminal past is
likely to be a liability. The individual has already shown that he (or she) has not felt constrained
to respect legal and ethical boundaries, or that he has exhibited poor judgment in not thinking
about adverse consequences. What indication is there that such behavior will not be repeated?
Furthermore, there is no indication that someone who breaks into a system knows how to protect
the system or make it better - he has only shown that he knows how to break in. This is the
origin of my "arsonist" statement, quoted in the article. As a customer of such a firm, it is
possible I would never be as confident about the integrity of its products as if the hacker had not
been hired.
From a professional standpoint, I view the hiring of computer criminals because of their
notoriety or criminal success to be insulting and unconscionable. Consider that there are
many tens of thousands of people who have worked for years to become knowledgeable and
responsible members of the profession, and many thousands more currently studying the disci-
pline. What will it mean to them if a criminal is hired to a position of responsibility because
of a violation of professional standards? Should the rest of us seek distinguished appointments
by spectacular violations of the law? ,~rhat would it say to all of us that a business would value
unethical behavior above a record of accomplishment and professionalism? To ignore or accept
such behavior is to allow our profession to be besmirched. I view it as an insult I and to acquiesce
quietly would appear to be a violation of our Code of Professional Conduct.
Note that I am not in any way suggesting that we act to prevent these individuals from being
employed in a computing-related profession. If the individual involved has the necessary training
and background, and is as qualified as other applicants, then he should be treated as any other
individual applying for a position. This is especially true once an individual has served a sentence
for his crimes. Robert T. Morris, for instance, has demonstrated a keen interest and more than
moderate facility with computers. To protest his taking a computing-related job would be to
unfairly embellish the sentence already imposed by the federal court. We should not seek to
second-guess om legal system, nor extract revenge above and beyond the punishment already
meted out. To do so would be petty and mcan~spirited.
In summary, my remarks at the Virus Workshop argued that we should protest if businesses
reward these offenders for their actionsj I did not mean to suggest that we forbid these individuals
from ever working in computing-relaLcd jobs. I also did not suggest that we devise any additional
punishment for Mr. Morris. He has been sentenced for his crime, and it is not for us to seek to






Tel: +1 317 494-7825
Fax: +1 317494-0739
E-mail: spaI@cs.purdue.edu
Mr. Patrick Young, Editor
Science News
1719 N. St. NW
Wa.shington, DC 20036
Dear Mr. Young:
Department of Computer Sciences
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1398
21 February 1991
In the February 9 Letters column, Professor Bruce Henricksen made some comments about
access to computing systems that are often made by others who do not understand the full
scope of what is stored on computers. His letter was printed without a response, and I believe a
response is warranted.
Professor Henricksen implies that access to ('nonmilitary, unclassified" systems should be
unrestricted; he cites the models of the library and the university for the sharing of ideas.
Unfortunately, such open access is something most people would not want - open access to
their medical records, their bank records, their credit histories, their income tax histories, or
their police records would not be something the average person would appreciate. At universities,
student grades and faculty personnel files are not open records, nor are results of prepublication
research - all of which are often kept on computers. At the library, librarians closely guard
records of what items individuals have checked out for personal use. In industry, trade secrets,
customer mailing lists, accounting and purchasing records, and personnel evaluations are all
kept confidential. The list can be extended. The list can be extended to include many more
"nonmilitary, unclassified" records that have a legitimate privacy requirement.
Another problem with unrestricted access to arbitrary systems is the difficulty of knowing
when access is merely to browse, and when it is a prelude (or attempt) at something less benign.
As someone who works in computer security research, I can assure you that access is the first
step in most cases of theft, sabotage, and other forms of computer security threat. Restricting
access is the best way to prevent malicious individuals from slipping into a system under the
guise of innocent curiousity.
In an ideal world, Professor Henricksen 's view of open access to computers might well be the
ideal. UnfortunatelYl we do not have an ideal world. The need for (and rights to) privacy, and
the need to keep systems secure from tampering mean that we must continue to restrict access





Tel: +1 317 494-7825
Fax: +1 317494-0739
FrmaiJ: spaf@cs.purdue.edu
Mr. Peter G. Brown, Editor
TIle Sciences
622 Broadway
New York, NY 10012
Dear Mr. Brown:
Department of Computer Sciences
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1398
30 September 1991
Although you invited me to respond in 500 words or less, I find that I cannot make an
adequate response within that constraint. I believe you have done a grave disservice to your
readers and to the community with the publication of Fred Cohen's article, and this letter
expresses the reasons why I believe that.
I began to read the recent article by Dr. Fred Cohen [1] with considerable interest. Dr.
Cohen is a pioneer in the field of computer virus research, and I have found many of his writings
quite thought-pI·ovoking. Unfortunately, by the time I finished his article, I was quite dismayed.
I believe that Dr. Cohen has failed to adequately consider both the practicality and the ethics of
his proposal.
First of all, I believe that there is an obvious conflict of interest involved when the vendor
of a computer virus prevention product sponsors a contest soliciting the development of new
vjruses. I am further troubled by the Jack of a list of the judges of the contest and the criteria for
winning. I will not discuss these points further, however, as they are minor matters compared
with my main concern: I believe that the writing of computer viruses is unethical, [2-3] and to
encourage their development in an unsupervised manner is likewise unethical.
Computer viruses spread without the informed consent of the owner of the software ("host")
they "infect," and they are usually not limited in their spread, in time or space. If scientists
were to experiment with organic viruses capable of infecting humans and possessing these same
properties, we would likely be taking vigilante action against them, contest or no. Encouraging
the general populace to develop organic viruses would bring about widespread condemnationj
yet, oddly, encouraging the development of computer viruses leads to publication in a journal.
To his credit, Dr. Cohen explicitly prohibits viruses that exhibit the above two dangerous
properties from being eligible for his contest. However, many viruses cause damage because of
flaws within the code, or unexpected properties of their target computing environmentj examples
include the "Stoned" virus for IBM PCs, and the "WDEF" virus for Apple Macintoshes (cL, [3-
5]). What will be the attitude of the community as a whole if a new destructive virus appears
on the scene because of a bug in the software meant to contain it? What if something similar to
Robert T. Morris's Internet Worm were to be discovered and explained as a buggy test version
intended for Cohen's contest?
This brings me to another argument with Dr. Cohen's article: we disagree about the definition
f I II • II C h d 'b M ., In ll· II h'l Io t le term computer virus. 0 en esen es orfJS s ternet program as a VIrUS, W 1 e
(and others) would define it as a llworm." [6-7] Morris's program did not alter existing software
to include a copy of itself as do viruses. His program was no more a virus than is a compiler
(suggesting an interesting class of potential submissions to the contest). In fact, if we intuit a
definition of "contest-acceptable virus" from Cohen's article to be something that spreads from
system to system} that requires permission to install itself, and has limited potential for spread
(like the Worm), it is no longer clear we are speaking about viruses at all!
Harold Thimbleby of Stirling University, Scotland and Ian Witten of Calgary University,
Canada have done extensive work on software that would meet the above intuited definition of
a computer virus. They have developed some very sophisticated self-propagating applications,
including self-updating databases with window-based interfaces. [8-9] It is not at all clear that
the community recognizes these as viruses. Professor Thimbleby himself has chosen to call them
"liveware'! to make the distinction clear. I am surprised that Dr. Cohen is unfamiliar with their
work and did not cite it in his Sciences article; it would be a clear favorite if it were to be entered
in the ASP contest. However, it also serves to illustrate how something that might win the
contest is not likely to be viewed as a l'virus" by the community of researchers.
This brings me to the second of my two major objections to Cohen's article and contest.
I believe that his underlying thesis is flawed: I do not believe that there are any practical
"good" viruses. During the Second Conference on Artificial Life, held in Santa Fe in 1990
(cf. [10]), I was on a panel discussing computer viruses. Russell Brand, another panelist, made
the observation that there is nothing that can be done by a computer virus that cannot be done
more efficiently and generally by other means. This observation was debated by the panel, and
discussed extensively by others since that time. To my knowledge! everyone involved in these
discussions now believes that is a true statement.
Consider that a computer virus is nothing other than a program coupled with code to trans-
port and install itself as part of existing software. It will be more difficult (or impossible) than
a stand-alone program to update for new releases, customize! and maintain. A virus will also
be more difficult to write and test for correctness than will a stand-alone program because of its
interaction with its environment. Viruses are simply not the most practical or efficient approach
to any particular task. His example in the article of the billing system demonstrates an inade-
quacy in the data model used and tools available, and not the superiority of using a quasi-virus.
Even the example Cohen gave in his PhD dissertation of a compression virus would be better
served by a well·written stand-alone program over which the user has more control. I believe
that any attempt made to promote "useful" viruses involves a contradiction of the word l'useful,"
assuming that uuseful" does not also imply l'malicious."
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To return to my first fundamental objection (and the one I feel most strongly about) -
the impropriety of encomaging virus authorship. We have been battling computer viruses for
five years now, and the indications are that the problem is growing exponentially (d. [11-12]).
Computer viruses - even those intended to be harmless, and limited in scope and duration -
continue to cause untold amounts of damage to computer systems. For someone of Dr. Cohen's
reputation within the field to actually promote the uncontrolled writing of any kind of virus, even
with his stated stipulations, is to act irresponsibly and immorally. To act in such a manner is
likely to encourage the development of yet more viruses "in the wild" by muddling the ethics and
dangers involved. It will reinforce the attitude that there may be some benefit to be gained from
writing viruses (when there is as yet absolutely no clear indication that such is the case), and may
encourage people to begin uncontrolled experiments with viruses they might not otherwise have
undertaken. We have seen cases already where well-trained virus researchers have accidentally
released experimental computer viruses into the populationj to encourage amateurs to also engage
in risky behavior that may lead to similar or worse results is quite appalling. It is my fond hope
that no one attempts to enter Dr. Cohen's contest, and that he quickly recognizes the dangers
and cancels it.
A few decades ago, physicists talked about peaceful uses of atomic weapons, such as blasting
out canals and destroying threatening icebergs. They were attempting, in good faith, to put
a better moral cast on their research. Thankfully, none of them offered money in a contest
for the best demonstration of such an application! Alfred Nobel, horrified at the use to which
his invention of stabilized explosives were being put, did not establish a contest for the best
peaceful use of dynamite. Instead, he established world-reknowned awards for research in peaceful
pursuits, funded by the income from his discovery. It is quite unfortunate that ASP and Dr.
Cohen could not have taken a sim.ilar approach with their $1000 prize. They could have made
a powerful statement about responsible behavior, but instead have increased the danger to the
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